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  PREFACE 
 
“He who understands baboon would do more towards 
metaphysics than Locke” Charles Darwin 1838 Notebook M 
 
This book is about human behavior (as are all books by anyone about anything), 
and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or 
much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the 
framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  As 
famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we 
evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was 
given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to 
actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a 
chance.  As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things 
than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy and dictatorship is inevitable.  
 
In order to provide an overview of the logical structure of higher order human 
behavior, that is of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (mind, 
language, rationality, personality, intentionality), or following Wittgenstein, of 
language games, I give a critical survey of some of the major findings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle, taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s 
fundamental discovery –that  all truly ‘philosophical’ (i.e., higher order 
psychological) problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can 
be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction 
or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything, but one cannot 
mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in 
a very specific context. I give an analysis from the recent modern perspective of the 
two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual 
systems nomenclature. 
 
It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so I try to describe (not 
explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior.  I start with a brief review of the logical 
structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of 
language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this 
relates to the evolution of social behavior.  This centers around the two writers I 
have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of 
thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent understanding of behavior 
and in thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially 
complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions 
that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher 
order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is 
only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the 
Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is 
the end of the discussion.  
 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as 
Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout 
human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, 
not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political 
science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of 
physics, mathematics, and biology.  It is universal to mix the language game 
questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism 
is ever present, and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein 
(hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness." (BBB p18) 
 
Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our 
psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st 
century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
(hereafter DMS), but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I 
mention in the articles.  
 
Horwich gives the most beautiful summary that I have ever seen of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as 
in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological 
foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no 
attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt 
to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no 
attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to 
make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and 
no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of 
personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Although there are countless books and articles on Wittgenstein, in my view only a 
few very recent ones (DMS, H, Coliva etc.) come close to a full appreciation of him, 
none make a serious attempt to relate his work to one of the other modern geniuses 
of behavior John Searle (hereafter S) and nobody has applied the powerful two 
systems of thought framework to philosophical issues from the viewpoint of 
evolutionary psychology. I attempt to do this here.   
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle 
on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my 
starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all truly ‘philosophical’ 
problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular 
context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in 
the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) 
are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state 
clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very 
specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the perspective 
of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new 
dual systems nomenclature. 
 
When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in a review as the 
Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for 
understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting 
that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know 
anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now 
characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual 
systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing 
behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, 
expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework 
being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research.  
 
Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and 
articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition 
of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article 
that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and 
background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work 
of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not 
explanation as W insisted) of behavior. 
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less 
accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it 
encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, 
literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and 
rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both 
conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or 
reflexes.  
 
The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly 
counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every 
action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 
to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As 
W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to 
actions.  
 
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads 
millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to 
espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth.  As 
W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.   We live in 
the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, 
automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness 
described by Searle as The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker as The Blank 
Slate and Tooby and Cosmides as The Standard Social Science Model.  
 
As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is 
universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am 
sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told 
that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that 
that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by 
stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other 
chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly 
true.  While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are 
wasting the earth and their descendant’s futures. 
 
The modern ‘digital delusions’, confuse the language games of System 2 with the 
automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., 
people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers).  The ‘reductionist’ claim is 
that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that 
one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it.  Hence the title of 
Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— 
“Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level 
emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Also, 
for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty 
(and chaos theory has been shown to be both incomplete in Godel’s sense and 
undecidable).  Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they 
‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what 
the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and 
philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor.  
 
I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, as 
Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, that the mind (roughly the same as language 
as Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved for many 
contexts, and there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, i.e., evolution 
by natural selection. 
 
Finally, as with my 90 some articles and 9 other books,  and in all my letters and 
email and conversations for over 50 years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ 
instead of ‘his/her’, ‘she/he’, or the idiotic reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being 
perhaps the only one in this part of the galaxy to do so.  The slavish use of these 
universally applied egregious vocables is of course intimately connected with the 
defects in our psychology which generate academic philosophy, democracy and the 
collapse of industrial civilization, and I leave the further description of these 
connections as an exercise for the reader. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys 2nd ed (2019), The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle 3rd ed. (2019), Suicide by Democracy 2nd ed (2019) and 
Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019).  
 
I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually 
revise it, but I took up philosophy 12 years ago at 65, so it is miraculous, and an 
eloquent testimonial to the power of System 1 automatisms, that I have been able to 
do anything at all. It was ten years of incessant struggle and I hope readers find it 
of some use. 
 
mstarks3d@yahoo.com 
 
 1 
 
 
 
      The Logical Structure of Human Behavior  
 
 
 
  “If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting 
whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know, 
after all.” Wittgenstein ‘On Certainty’ p48 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that all 
truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data 
gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular 
context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in 
the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) 
are clear.  The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state 
clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very 
specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks at 
perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and 
‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and 
commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the 
sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses of related sentences and 
that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. There are no 
‘problems’ of ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only the need to keep 
the use (COS) of these words clear. It is truly sad that most philosophers continue 
to waste their time on the linguistic confusions peculiar to academic philosophy 
rather than turning their attention to those of the other behavioral disciplines and 
to physics, biology and mathematics, where it is desperately needed. 
 
What has W really achieved? Here is how a leading Wittgenstein scholar 
summarized his work:  “Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that 
have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two 
millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the 
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relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth 
and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy 
of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights 
into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on 
the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist 
epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not 
to human knowledge, but to human understanding – understanding of the forms 
of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—
Peter Hacker-- 'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the two 
systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic 
dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited 
background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, 
so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He 
noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental 
experiences are not describable in language, this being possible only for behavior 
with a public language (the impossibility of private language). He predicted the 
utility of paraconsistent logic which only emerged much later. Incidentally he 
patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip 
jets to drive the rotors, and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine 
engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a 
modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed 
by others. He laid out the psychological foundations of mathematics, logic, 
incompleteness, and infinity. 
 
Horwich gives the most beautiful summary that I have ever seen of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as 
in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic  to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological 
foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no 
attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt 
to reform it (PI 124,132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no 
attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to 
make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and 
no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of 
personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
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He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist, since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. Though nobody seems aware of it, he described the psychology 
behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) decades later. He noted the indeterminate or 
underdetermined nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. 
He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational 
theory of mind, long before practical computers or the famous writings of Searle. 
He invented truth tables for use in logic and philosophy. He decisively laid to rest 
skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the 
activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive 
psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the 
nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world, and, like 
Einstein, nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his 
ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely 
changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge 
of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures 
and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and 
pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, 
underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; 
that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what 
they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness 
(not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation 
of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many 
statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that 
virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands  of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work 
in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
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extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on 
the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing 
and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that 
to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people 
who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I 
claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle 
(another modern genius of descriptive psychology), Pinker, Tooby and Cosmides, 
Symons, and countless other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank 
Ramsey had not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost 
certainly have ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his 
lover, one of the most amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. 
In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been 
different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very 
different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well or 
had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful have any real grasp 
of his work even today. He could have shined as an engineer, a mathematician, a 
psychologist, a physiologist (he did wartime research in it), a musician (he played 
instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the house he 
designed and constructed for his sister still stands), or an entrepreneur (he inherited 
one of the largest fortunes in the world but gave it all away). It is a miracle he 
survived the trenches and prison camps and repeatedly volunteering for the most 
dangerous duty (while writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal 
depressions (3 brothers succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and 
executed by the Nazis (he was partly Jewish and probably only the Nazi’s desire to 
lay hands on their money saved the family), and that he was not persecuted for his 
homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized nobody 
understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was half a 
century –or a whole century depending on your point of view-ahead of psychology 
and philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that our brain is an 
evolved organ like our heart.) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of TLP, BBB, PI, OC by W, and PNC 
(Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World (MSW), Seeing Things As 
They Are (STATA), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy (SPCP), John R 
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Searle – Thinking About the Real World (TARW), and other books by and about 
these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. I begin with some 
penetrating quotes from W and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 
94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no 
real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
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what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 
reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence "It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is an idea that 
"something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The 
chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest similarity with what it 
represents." 
BBBp37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously 
not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and that they are not 
clear about the differences between the uses of the word "kind", when they talk of 
kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word "kind" here meant the same 
thing as in the context "kinds of apples." Or, we may say, they are not aware of the 
different meanings of the word "discovery" when in one case we talk of the 
discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery 
of the South Pole." BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
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"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer." 
TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, 
that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the 
matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the 
grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we 
have already got everything and need not wait for the future." (said in 1930) 
Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
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"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not anything 
that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is connected, I believe, 
with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon 
it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from two of our greatest descriptive 
psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
(in the strict sense I consider here) is the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked -
i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. In addition to failing to make it 
clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely specify 
exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that other students of 
behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W's above remark on science envy, 
I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want 
to know when knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need 
to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is 
it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an 
ability? Could knowing or believing that p be identical with a state of the brain? 
Why can one say ` he believes that p, but it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot 
say `I believe that p, but it is not the case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and 
means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to 
faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and 
how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on 
- through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognizing, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention 
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the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if 
these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways 
in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their 
compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15(2005). 
 
On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. 
Apart from the Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, although 
some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his classes), leading 
to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some works are known to 
have been lost and many others W had destroyed. Most of this Nachlass was 
microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and copies were bought by a very few 
libraries. Budd -Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (1989)- like most W 
commentators of the period, does not reference the microfilm. Although much of 
the Nachlass is repetitive and appears in some form in his subsequently published 
works (which are referenced by Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and 
there is substantial material that has never been translated from the original 
German nor published in book form. 
 
Lecture notes by Yorick Smithies appeared in 2018 and even now we are awaiting 
what seems to be a version of the Brown Book, left with his lover Francis Skinner – 
‘Wittgenstein, Dictating Philosophy to Francis Skinner’ (Springer, 2019). In 1998, 
the Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text 
and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition $2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. 
It is available through interlibrary loan and free on the net as well. Like the other 
CDs of W’s work, it is available from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is indexed and 
searchable and the prime W resource. However, my extensive readings of the W 
literature show that very few people have bothered to consult it and thus their 
works are lacking a critical element. One can see Victor Rodych’s papers on W’s 
remarks on Godel for one notable exception. One major work dating from W’s 
middle period (1933) that was published as a book in 2000 is the famous Big 
Typescript. Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (1991) is one of the 
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better treatments of W (see my review) but since he finished this book in 1989, 
neither the Big Typescript nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he 
neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far the most important works 
date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by Budd. 
 
Wittgenstein’s wholly novel ideas and unique super-Socratic trialogues (my term) 
and telegraphic writing, coupled with his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, 
and premature death in 1951, resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later 
thought during his lifetime and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 
pages been published- a project which continues to this day. The only complete 
edition of the largely German nachlass was first issued by Oxford in 2000 with 
Intelex now publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English language books on 
a searchable CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford CD is over $1000 
or over $2000 for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. They can 
however be obtained via interlibrary loan and also, like most books and articles, are 
now freely available on the net (libgen.io, b-ok.org and on p2p).  The searchable 
CDROM of his English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, is 
now on several sites on the net and the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca. 
2021-- http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). And of 
course, most academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and 
libgen.io. 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, 
and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works suffer from 
clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where one has to 
understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to translate. Since, in 
my view, nobody except Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) has grasped the full 
import of his later works (but of course she has recently published widely and many 
are now aware of her views), one can see why W has yet to be fully appreciated. 
Even the more or less well-known critical difference between understanding ‘Satz’ 
as ‘sentence’ (i.e., what can be regarded in many contexts as an S1 utterance) vs 
‘proposition’ (i.e., in many contexts a meaningful S2 utterance with Conditions of 
Satisfaction) in various contexts has usually escaped notice. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern and DMS in a recent article are rare exceptions) that 
W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) 
suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in the 
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brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He also 
suggested several times that the causal chain has an end, and this could mean both 
that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further, 
and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point (p34). 
Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions without any idea that W 
anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century now in a few instances). 
 
With DMS I regard W’s last book ‘On Certainty’ (OC) as the foundation stone of 
philosophy and psychology. It is not really a book but notes he made during the 
last two years of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to work. He 
seems to have been principally motivated by the realization that G.E. Moore’s 
simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all philosophy--how it’s 
possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and not to be able to doubt it. 
All anyone can do is to examine minutely the working of the language games of 
‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are used to describe the primitive 
automated prelinguistic system one (S1) functions of our brain (my K1, C1 and D1) 
and the advanced deliberative linguistic system two (S2) functions (my K2, C2 and 
D2).  Of course, W does not use the two systems terminology, which only came to 
the fore in psychology some half century after his death, and has yet to penetrate 
philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two systems framework (the ‘grammar’) in 
all of his work from the early 30’s on, and one can see clear fore-shadowings in his 
very earliest writings. 
 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after half 
a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and Wittgenstein” 
(2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), The Varieties of Self- Knowledge’(2016), 
Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014) and Andy Hamilton’s ‘Routledge Philosophy 
Guide Book to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’,  and the many books and papers of 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 
volumes on Human Nature. DMS and PH have been the leading scholars of the 
later W, each writing or editing half a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and 
many papers in the last decade. However, the difficulties of coming to grips with 
the basics of our higher order psychology, i.e., of how language (approximately the 
same as the mind, as W showed us) works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most 
brilliant and prolific contemporary philosophers, who made remarks in a very 
recent article which show that after years of intensive work on the later W, she 
seems not to have grasped that he solved the most basic problems of the description 
of human behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even coherently state 
misgivings about the operations of our basic psychology (W’s ‘Hinges’ which I 
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equate with S1) without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of 
both of these workers (limitations shared by all students of behavior) in her recent 
articles, which (like those of Coliva and Hacker) are freely available on the net. 
 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the concept 
of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not only to Moore 
but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On Certainty shows 
Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – the problem that 
occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the foundation of knowledge. 
 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers have 
traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must ultimately 
be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be based on further 
propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are really animal or 
unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look like 
(empirical) propositions. It is this misleading appearance that leads philosophers to 
believe that at the foundation of thought is yet more thought. Yet though they may 
often look like empirical conclusions, our basic certainties constitute the 
ungrounded, non-propositional underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus 
situating the foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest 
themselves as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification 
comes to an end, and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, 
shown the logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is a 
groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of calling On Certainty 
Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.”  
 
I reached the same general conclusions myself some years ago and stated it in my 
book reviews. 
 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type hinge 
certainties in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical propositions', but are 
not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties are not putative metaphysical 
propositions that appear to describe the necessary features of the world, but they 
are putative empirical propositions that appear to describe the contingent features 
of the world. And therein lies some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is 
continuous with all of Wittgenstein's earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in 
that it comes at the end of a long, unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar of our 
language-games, to demarcate grammar from language in use. Baker and Hacker 
have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the grammatical 
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nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what sets On Certainty 
apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' propositions 
and others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not form a homogenous mass' (OC 
213)): some apparently empirical and contingent propositions being in fact nothing 
but expressions of grammatical rules. The importance of this realization is that it 
leads to the unprecedented insight that basic beliefs – though they look like 
humdrum empirical and contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, 
when conceptually elucidated, can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they 
underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for 
many years' underpins all thought and action, but not as a proposition that strikes 
us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that underpins what we do (e.g., 
we research the age of the earth) and what we say (e.g., we speak of the earth in the 
past tense): ‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – 
but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately  as true, i.e. it is not 
a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-
game.’ (OC 204)” 
 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that has 
plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying 
propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true empirical 
propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-breaking insight that 
our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain propositions striking us… 
as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC was to claim that our basic 
beliefs are true empirical propositions, why bother? He would be merely repeating 
what philosophers before him have been saying for centuries, all the while 
deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather appreciate that 
Wittgenstein has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” -(2013)).” 
 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy and 
psychology) that (as I have noted many times) in a decade of intensive reading, I 
have not seen one person make the obvious connection between W’s ‘grammar’ and 
the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which constitute System 1, and its 
extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For anyone familiar with the 
two systems framework for understanding behavior that has dominated various 
areas of psychology such as decision theory for the last several decades, it should 
be glaringly obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call them B1) are the inherited 
automated true-only structure of S1 and that their extension with experience into 
true or false sentences (or as I call them B2) are what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. 
This may strike some as a mere terminological trifle, but I have used the two 
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systems view and its tabulation below as the logical structure of rationality for a 
decade and regard it a major advance in understanding higher order behavior, and 
hence of W or any philosophical or behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to 
grasp the fundamental importance of the automaticity of our behavior due to S1 
and the consequent attribution of all social interaction (e.g., politics) to the 
superficialities of S2 can be seen as responsible for the inexorable collapse of 
industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to basic biology and 
psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the world’s problems via politics, 
but only a drastic restructuring of society with understanding of the fundamental 
role of inclusive fitness as manifested via the automaticities of S1 has any chance to 
save the world. The oblivion to S1 has been called by Searle ‘The phenomenological 
Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard 
Social Science Model’. 
 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He realized 
by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look at how language 
actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of language from the very 
first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of finding one’s way out. The entire 
book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ which separate themselves out into 
‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ certainty that cannot meaningfully be questioned 
(my K1 or W’s Intransitive) and ‘know’ as a disposition to act (my K2 or W’s 
Transitive), which functions the same as think, hope, judge, understand, imagine, 
remember, believe and many other dispositional words. As I have suggested in my 
various reviews of W and S, these two uses correspond to the modern two systems 
of thought framework that is so powerful in understanding behavior (mind, 
language), and this (and his other work) is the first significant effort to show how 
our fast, prelinguistic automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic 
basis (‘hinges’) for our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional 
psychology. As I have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my 
knowledge, has ever stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away 
with no clear idea of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any of 
his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death 
and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. There are few references to 
it in Searle (along with Hacker, W’s heir apparent and one of the most famous living 
philosophers) and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are 
however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, Coliva, McGinn and 
 15 
 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but the best is that of Daniele 
Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting 
point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. 
However (in my view) all analysis of W falls short of fully grasping his unique and 
revolutionary advances by failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and 
contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt here. I will not give a page by 
page explanation since (as with any other book dealing with behavior-i.e., 
philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, law, politics, religion, 
literature etc.) we would not get past the first few pages, as all the issues discussed 
here arise immediately in any discussion of behavior.  
 
The table below summarizing the Logical Structure of Rationality (Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) provides a framework for this and all 
discussion of behavior. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now 
known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just behavior or even 
higher order animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was 
written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral 
sciences and humanities, and even those few who have understood him have not 
realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions 
(e.g., the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to 
him infrequently, but his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, 
though he does not seem to see this. W analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), 
Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but 
mostly stop short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he 
certainly belongs. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and 
correct, all accounts of higher order behavior are describing the same phenomena 
and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes 
of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into 
W’s work (and they do). 
 
The failure of most to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited 
attention On Certainty (0C) and his other 3rd period works have received until 
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recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and others to 
understand how profoundly our view of behavior alters once we embrace the 
evolutionary framework. I call the framework the descriptive psychology of higher 
order thought- DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in 
DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), which grounds 
anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature 
and history. 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent 
person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century 
earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our 
true-only axiomatic background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets 
the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that even the 
brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a 
tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was laid out in great detail in 
"On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
(DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of 
our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. 
Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my or our memory and 
vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out of and are tied to 
countless others in the true-only network that begins with birth and extends in all 
directions to encompass much of our awareness and memory. A corollary, nicely 
explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the 
skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense 
including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of 
involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without 
education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the 
unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s 
‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent 
article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of 
meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously experienced. See 
Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review of it. 
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It is essential to grasp the W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework so I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker and 
Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) et. al. To grasp my 
simple two systems terminology and perspective, it will help to see my reviews of 
W/S and other books about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of 
higher order behavior not found in psychology books. To say that Searle has 
extended W’s work is not necessarily to imply that it is a direct result of W study 
(and he is clearly not a Wittgensteinian), but rather that because there is only ONE 
human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that 
anyone accurately describing behavior must be enunciating some variant or 
extension of what W said. 
 
However, S seldom mentions W and even then, often in a critical way, but in my 
view his criticisms (like everyone’s) nearly always miss the mark and he makes 
many dubious assertions for which he is often criticized. In present context, I find 
the recent criticisms of DMS, Coliva and Hacker most relevant. Nevertheless, he is 
the prime candidate for the best since W and I recommend downloading the over 
100 video lectures he has on the net. Unlike nearly all other philosophy lectures they 
are quite entertaining and informative and I have heard them all at least twice. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) from 
the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To rephrase: all study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast System 1 (S1) and slow System 
2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions. Searle's 
work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social behavior 
including ‘we intentionality’, while the later W shows how S2 is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and in each of our personal histories 
developed into conscious dispositional propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of psychology 
is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that philosophers are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. He noted 
that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another notable comment was that if we are not 
concerned with “causes” the activities of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 
(1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum 
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that the problem is not to find the solution but to recognize as the solution what 
appears to be only a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 
years ago that we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior 
and that these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125). See the full quotes at other 
places in this article. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, speech) is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor’s LOT, 
Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language of Thought” of 
which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in action, that language 
is not a picture of, but is itself thinking or the mind, and his whole corpus can be 
regarded as the development of this idea. 
 
Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view none 
better than W in BBB p37 — “if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, 
though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow 
between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can 
serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the 
slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, language issues direct from the 
brain and what could count as evidence for an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games (LG’s) 
did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes 
and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these investigations is to 
find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral 
muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind 
but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and 
future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the 
Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, 
intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods 
are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the 
irrelevance of our subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and the 
impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, 
System 1, fast thinking, true-only, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, 
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supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that 
‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all 
philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is 
not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just 
have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1 “the greatest danger here is 
wanting to observe oneself”). 
 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, 
PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to describe and extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they 
can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, multiply our language games, 
and extend S2. The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) 
“bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and 
which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved 
and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF), i.e., by natural selection. 
 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb 
“Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of evolutionary 
thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF is the prime 
mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The Social Conquest 
of Earth' (2012)). 
 
As W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a 
true-only extension (i.e., S2 Hinges or S2H) of our axiomatic EP (i.e., S1 Hinges or 
S1H) and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without threatening our sanity—as he noted, 
a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different consequences from one in S2 
(testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique 
manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense) cannot get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of 
involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not testable propositions (as I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his 
work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at 
the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but 
neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework over 50 years 
ago), which is involuntary and automatic and which corresponds to the mental 
states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and over. One might 
call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by 
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energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware 
another network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what 
W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and propositional 
(true or false), and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar mostly 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only 
sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic 
S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally termed Causally Self 
Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-Reflexive) or reflexive or 
intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), and the S2  use, which is their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or 
false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in 
the strict sense, and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). The equation of these 
terms from modern psychology with those used by W and S (and much else here) 
is my idea, so don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my books, articles and 
reviews on viXra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu, Amazon, 
libgen.io, b-ok.org etc.). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of involuntary fast 
thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) 
and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “implicit 
cognition”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too are language 
games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies 
and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the 
norm as W made clear, but of course he did not use this terminology), but 
presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional thinking only, since any thought 
(intentional action) cannot occur without involving much of  the  intricate S1 
network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle 
call our EP) which must also use S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by all 
discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1, composed of 
perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
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axioms of our psychology are not evidential. As he famously said in OC p94— “but 
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do 
I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is the inherited background 
against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When 
I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to 
the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is no 
other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on 
W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet and like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language.” And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite of his 
frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing (for which he is often 
incorrectly criticized by Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find (as DMS also notes).  
 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning “speaker meaning... is 
the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” -- which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false, and this is an act and not a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in 
Philosophy in a New Century p193 — “the basic intentional relation between the 
mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is 
anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those 
intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition 
is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out 
that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- propositions being public 
events that can be true or false –contra the perverse use of the word for the true-
only axioms of S1 by Searle, Coliva and others. Hence, the famous comment by W 
from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to 
see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole problem 
of representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) –“what it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen-and- the 
question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. 
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And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. Suppose it 
were asked -do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes is now called Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and 
UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has become aware of the work of Daniel 
Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation 
can be involved in UA1-- that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his first 
book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid 
the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core of 
the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, implicit cognition, automatisms 
and higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from 
W. In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have rarely seen 
anything approaching an adequate discussion in philosophy or other behavioral 
science texts, and commonly there is barely a mention. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic 
in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from 
the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, 
Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an 
heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of 
studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical 
term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other recent 
writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in Wittgenstein, and a much simpler table by 
Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on 
Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come from decision research, 
mainly by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
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System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2   and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**         Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****      Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****    Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
*******Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain 
present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, 
while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented 
in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but 
frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). 
There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 
and long-term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are 
successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the 
description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - Searle) 
as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to distinguish 
it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, 
there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and 
in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states or the pattern of activations 
of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing a red apple’) and this is one 
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reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order behavior to a ‘system of laws’ 
which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings 
against theories. And what counts as ‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see 
e.g., Nancy Cartwright). This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by Searle, DMS, 
Hacker, W and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-only 
“mental states” with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in 
higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space 
and time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction- Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 
and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into 
R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with 
all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Dispositions, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), 
Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not 
to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W - ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions 
of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements 
about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements 
about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an 
incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering 
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etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). Preferences are intrinsic, 
observer independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness and Language p53). 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) events 
and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ 
(my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System 
One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-
66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event 
occurs—see my reviews of the well known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out 
in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of my 
table here in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). This table expands on W’s 
survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his 
very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), 
cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by 
DMS) the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the 
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unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
(represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action – IA - Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle, e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…”), or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…’) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — 
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts 
such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition, and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
“private mental states” for thinking or willing (i.e.,no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature  
 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
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Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects). 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do. 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior ((The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The 
Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM)). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of 
objects, nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed 
by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the 
operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in 
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evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and 
actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are 
in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives 
an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly 
questionable due to severe underdetermination - i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and 
hence nothing. This occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting 
in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle) - (i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of 
this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein 
from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The 
general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of 
the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895, cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language 
games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and 
deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy 
edges in some contexts, as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
the dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—nonrational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information 
until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular 
 32 
 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a 
public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do 
thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. 
Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to 
substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross 
contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called 
UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in 
S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the 
innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought 
which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—i.e., 
Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of 
frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast 
functions). We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain 
works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in 
full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, 
biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to 
our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. 
Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to 
facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and 
reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. This has been 
explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have 
multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different 
roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense 
first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my 
ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem 
(in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on 
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knowledge or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). 
In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of 
saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs 
used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate 
themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or 
future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public 
acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no 
information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” 
or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). 
 
Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to 
be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 since 
in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of S2. 
Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 
Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-
Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) 
of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for 
an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are Coliva, 
Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who, like many scholars now, 
have posted most of their work (often in preprint form) free online at academia.edu, 
philpapers.org, researchgate.net, and other sites, and of course the diligent can find 
almost everything free online via torrents, p2p, libgen.io, b-ok.org etc. Baker & 
Hacker are found in their many joint works and on Hacker’s personal page. The late 
Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic 
interpretation that was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late 
Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is a must read for any student of behavior. 
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One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of 
S1, which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of 
scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- hereafter CDC—my 
acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many others 
pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in the BBB in 
the 30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the 
way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and 
countless others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made 
clear) S2 in causal terms is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and 
it is not clear that the highly diverse language games of “causality” can ever  be 
made to apply (as has been noted many times) - even their application in physics 
and chemistry is variable and  often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer 
or hormones or the wind or all of them that made the apple fall, and when did the 
causes start and end)? But as W said - “now if it is not the causal connections which 
we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side, as usually 
stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not leaving his trialogues 
unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my reviews of W, S etc., and then 
study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. as 
feasible before digging into the literature of causality and the philosophy of science, 
and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has hit the mark. 
 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers have 
little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses of 
‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature of dispositions, 
and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as private language, 
introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a 
century ago. 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they cite. 
Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly complete 
omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely discussed modern 
philosopher with about one new book and dozens of articles largely or wholely 
devoted to him every month. He has his own journal “Philosophical Investigations” 
and I expect his bibliography exceeds that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers 
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combined. Searle is perhaps next among moderns (and the only one with many 
lectures on YouTube, Vimeo, University sites etc.—over 100, which, unlike almost 
all other philosophy lectures, are a delight to listen to) and Hutto, Coliva, DMS, 
Hacker, Read, etc., are very prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of 
articles, talks and reviews. But CDC and other metaphysicians ignore them and the 
thousands who regard their work as critically important. 
 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large as that of modern 
research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are 
abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, hopefully your view 
of most writing in this arena may be quite different from theirs. But as W insisted, 
one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his super-Socratic 
trialogues had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in 
my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple as 
pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we 
all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a 
‘beetle’, then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box could contain 
a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private language that only I can 
know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it 
cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruther’s ISA theory of 
mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have 
explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, 
Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations” (2004) for a nice explanation of Private Language and everything by 
Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. But, the 
very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language games) 
presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- contradictory 
cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact on the daily life of 
anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person point of view is just 
not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but absence of coherence 
is no problem for the cartoon views of life. Likewise, with the description of brain 
function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- well 
debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. 
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Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of 
many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and 
hopeless, but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like this. There 
is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and then the 
experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with human behavior 
combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious automatisms of S1 
(absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that self, will, and 
consciousness are illusions, since they think they are showing us the ‘real’ meaning 
of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and 
must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of S1. Hence, a reason for 
the shift from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my 
review of Carruther’s recent ‘The Opacity of Mind’. Even Searle is a frequent 
offender here as noted by Hacker, Bennet and Hacker, DMS, Coliva etc. 
 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken, or 
if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described as having 
a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we must regard it 
as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent), but irrelevant to how we use 
language and how we live, which should be regarded as the point from which to 
begin and end such discussions. 
 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the problems 
of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-not Quine, 
Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I consider 
here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the appearance of a 
question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or the universe) does it but 
S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. 
We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does, courtesy of the death of countless trillions of 
organisms over some 3 billion years. We can describe the world easily but often 
cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ should look like. So, we struggle with science 
and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at 
“complete” knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a description of what 
neuronal patterns correspond to seeing red, but it is not clear what it would mean 
(COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, 
explanations come to an end somewhere. 
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For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruther’s “Opacity of 
Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds of 
others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of our 
higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given a quite 
different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no reasons for 
action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary problems by trying 
to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike us that these views 
have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of their adult 
life promoting them. 
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard Problem 
of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and more remote, the 
more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and perception and 
intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced if we face up to it as a 
‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, embodied in a context 
(inextricably natural and social) at a given time, etc…then it can become 
perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ 
information across human and non-human domains (supposedly using the non-
human-the animal {usually thought of as mechanical} or the machine-as one’s 
paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), does it begin to look as if there is 
a problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), 
behaviorism and so on)…push further and further from our reach…the very 
conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard 
problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been given for us to think 
that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no 
good reason to think that there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or 
of society, any more than there need be a science of numbers, or of universes or of 
capital cities or of games or of constellations or of objects whose names start with 
the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as embodied persons 
acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ in 
them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap into 
an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and when it is really 
present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when our machines 
come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our machines are only 
calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no such thing as getting an 
external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard problem is insoluble, 
…Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been 
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defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive indefinitely 
of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological satisfaction of both a 
humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the understanding and, the 
knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, that in stating those limits, can see 
beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the 
Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn in language and what lies on the other 
side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 88 years ago that ‘mysteries’ satisfy 
a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the ‘limits of 
human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and that we should 
dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in the fact that we cannot 
describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except by repeating the sentence 
(see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat 
frequently his remark that “superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” -
-written a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the philosophical 
problems about mental processes (and all philosophical problems). "How does the 
philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism 
arise? The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them -- we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way 
of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to 
know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been 
made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) -- And now the 
analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have 
to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now 
it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny 
them.” 
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a person 
who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as we 
do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all scientific questions have 
been answered, nothing is left to question, and that is itself the answer. And central 
to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to scientism, not science) failures of CDC 
et al is his observation that it is a very common mistake to think that something 
must make us do what we do, which leads to the confusion between cause and 
reason. “And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are 
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inclined to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence 
“It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an 
idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the 
confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as 
we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no 
reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. W saw in his 
own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself by working 
out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told the answers. 
Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and ‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is 
often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the most prominent 
philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also the fact (seldom 
mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, reduction does not 
stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be extended (and has often been) 
to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. 
What exactly should make neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks 
generated the idea that nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the 
universe as a giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in 
the history of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer 
automaton in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, 
reductionism, behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, 
to a Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books 
in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive commentary 
on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W realized one has to 
work on oneself—self therapy via long hard working through of ‘perspicuous 
examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy it is 
to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James Jeans 
long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great 
machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’,  ‘cause’, ‘event’, ‘happen’, 
‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in science or 
philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in at random with 
many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without sense. Much of academic 
discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high comedy (as opposed to the low 
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comedy of most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., “comedy dealing with polite 
society, characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”-
(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time--done rightly, it is the best 
way to spend time. How else can we dispel the chaos in the behavioral sciences or 
describe our mental life and the higher order thought of System 2--the most 
intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s examples 
describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of System 2 to build 
on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and as societies acquire a 
world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on the bedrock of our 
axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive perception and action to the amazing 
edifice of science and culture. The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity 
passed long ago from something that could be challenged to certainties that can 
only be modified, and at the other end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of 
finding out that there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view 
is incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though written 
when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant as 
his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy (the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the light, after three 
thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away from philosophy and 
from physics. 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
 
Let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center 
of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
An excellent recent work that displays many of the philosophical confusions in a 
book putatively about science and mathematics is Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of 
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Reason: What Science, Mathematics and Logic Cannot Tell Us’ (2013) (see my 
review). 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem becomes 
a philosophical one - i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. Yanofsky, 
like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does not get that there are two 
distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., Language Games or LG’s) here. 
There are those that are matters of fact about how the world is—that is, they are 
publicly observable propositional (True or False) states of affairs having clear 
meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --COS in Searle’s terminology)—i.e., scientific 
statements, and then there are those that are issues about how language can 
coherently be used to describe these states of affairs, and these can be answered by 
any sane, intelligent, literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science. 
Another poorly understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, 
representing, inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional 
psychology) of a true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition 
of our slow, conscious System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are 
entangled, the star shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that 
involves seeing that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is 
always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, 
touching etc. in which there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no 
COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives its 
inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to view 
reasoning or rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of 
which science, math and philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly 
growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or 
science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use 
language to carry out actions—see W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.) is ‘Human Reasoning 
and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of 
its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the broad structure of 
intentional psychology), is (as of 2019) the best single source I know. 
 
W wrote a great deal on the philosophy of mathematics since it clearly illustrated 
many of the types of confusions generated by ‘scientific’ language games, and there 
have been countless commentaries, many quite poor. I will comment on some of the 
best recent work as it is brought up by Yanofsky. 
 
Francisco Berto has made some penetrating comments recently. He notes that W 
denied the coherence of metamathematics - i.e., the use by Godel of a metatheorem 
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to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” interpretation of Godel’s 
theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his argument, I think we are forced to deny 
the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can 
it be that such concepts (words, language games) as metamathematics and 
incompleteness, accepted by millions (and even claimed by no less than Penrose, 
Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) 
are just simple misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in 
this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and 
will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no practical 
impact whatsoever? 
 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very same 
sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and 
demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different 
system (the meta- system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the 
very meaning of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence 
(that is, for a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, 
but decided in a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject 
both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic 
consequence that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all 
arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then 
there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” 
And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a 
paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical 
features of such theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned 
Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from 
Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, 
demonstrably complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely 
Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be mathematical problems 
that can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which the rules of the 
system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of paraconsistent arithmetics 
harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical 
career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our 
behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of 
pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an 
unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that 
mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that 
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is all that Godel and Gregory Chaitin show. W commented many times that ‘truth’ 
in math means axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that 
one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly different from 
empirical matters where one applies a test. W often noted that to be acceptable as 
mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have 
real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since 
it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider 
arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot 
be used in the real world either. As Victor Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that 
a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-
game) if it has an extra-systemic application in a system of contingent propositions 
(e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say 
this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, 
‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the 
tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with 
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing 
is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, being 
misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other comments (see 
Rodych and Floyd). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008 - see arxiv.org) on the limits 
to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device 
doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply 
across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he summarized thusly: 
“One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly processing 
information faster than the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot 
exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be 
an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They 
also hold even if one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published 
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what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) 
which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has 
published various versions of these over two decades in some of the most 
prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as 
well as in NASA journals, and has gotten news items in major science journals, few 
seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, 
decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, since 
his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in Turing 
machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantor’s diagonalization to 
include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms and thus may be seen 
as the last word not only on computation, but on cosmology or even deities. He 
achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the inferring universe using 
worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it does it) so that his 
mathematical proofs are independent of any particular physical laws or 
computational structures in establishing the physical limits of inference for past, 
present and future and all possible calculation, observation and control. He notes 
that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly 
predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or present) and that his 
impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty 
principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any 
universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, 
and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”). Since space 
and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire universe 
across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with two 
inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, “either the 
Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction 
complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity) in that there is 
one and only one version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.” 
 
Another way to say this is that one cannot have two physical inference devices 
(computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output of the 
other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any 
arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference engines, 
there are always binary valued questions about the state of the universe that cannot 
even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a computer that can predict 
an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the 
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condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it—that is, it cannot 
process information (though this is a vexed phrase as S and Read and others note) 
faster than the universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is 
computing do not have to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws 
of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an 
infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to be spatially localized 
but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is 
well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd 
etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, 
in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no reference to him and 
another remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky 
either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that can 
process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a perfect 
memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be perfectly 
or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved that no 
combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) 
and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language that 
concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on W:  ”He is articulating in other words a 
generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus generally applicable, not 
only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing or rule-governed 
expression of them; it does not rely on any particular notational device or preferred 
spatial arrangements of signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no 
picture and it is not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may 
be diagrammed and insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented 
formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular 
formalism. [The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it 
explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) 
an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. 
Every line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an instruction or 
command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” It should be obvious 
how Wolpert’s work is a perfect illustration of W’s ideas of the separate issues of 
science or mathematics and those of philosophy (language games). 
 
Yanofsky also does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is 
expanding rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, 
mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom have been 
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publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, 
uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is the recent proof 
by Armando Assis that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one 
can setup a zero-sum game between the universe and an observer using the Nash 
Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. 
Godel was first to demonstrate an impossibility result, and (until the remarkable 
papers of David Wolpert—see here and my review article) it is the most far reaching 
(or just trivial/incoherent), but there have been an avalanche of others. One of the 
earliest in decision theory was the famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) 
discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which he got the Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel laureates so this is not 
fringe science).  It states roughly that no reasonably consistent and fair voting 
system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ preferences into group 
preferences) can give sensible results. The group is either dominated by one person, 
and so GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive 
preferences. Arrow’s original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social 
Welfare" and can be stated like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference 
ordering that satisfies all of the following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual 
Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of 
Group Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many 
related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find 
it (and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career path 
that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) 
among legions of publications. 
 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these 
impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) which shows that 
any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One interpretation of the 
result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just logic) are available to the 
players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs that the players can write 
down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold (i.e., no clear COS). “Ann believes 
that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems 
unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) has been assumed in argumentation, 
linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but they showed that it is 
impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing 
body of such impossibility results for 1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it 
grades into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper 
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from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper 
from arXiv.org, which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its 
title notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and 
thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofksy’s 
paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin 
of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among other 
things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend, and so Yanofsky contributes a 
paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and 
related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday 
and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’.  For a 
good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
Since Godel’s famous theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic ‘randomness’ (‘incompleteness’) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior, 
language, mind) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved 
by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as 
unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ 
(again a group of LG’s) shows there are limitless theorems that are true but 
unprovable— i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to say that there are 
limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe 
actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one 
considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and 
the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme 
context sensitivity of language, math and logic. The recent papers of Rodych, Floyd 
and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of 
mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
As noted, David Wolpert has derived some amazing theorems in Turing Machine 
Theory and the limits of computation that are very apropos here. They have been 
almost universally ignored but not by well known econometricians Koppl and 
Rosser, who, in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already crossed 
your mind”, give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control 
in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to 
show some logical limits to forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be 
viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s incompleteness theorem and K and R say 
that their variant can be viewed as its social science analog, though Wolpert is well 
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aware of the social implications. K and R‘s second theorem shows possible 
nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) forecasting in infinite-dimensional 
space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an 
economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that 
these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are 
caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves 
has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R 
conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other than 
calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject 
of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or false) and 
thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That is, there are 
public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth or falsity. “Beyond 
reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are not clear and the reason 
would be that it does not have a clear context. It is a matter of fact if we have clear 
COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make the observation--this is not beyond 
reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter 
if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind and the universe computers?” sounds like 
it needs scientific or mathematical investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify 
the context in which this language will be used, since these are ordinary and 
unproblematic terms and it is only their context which is puzzling. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only clear 
descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the problems are 
confusions about how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in their 
sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is only one reality, so there 
are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be 
given, and we can only communicate in our one public language. There cannot be 
a private language and any “private inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and 
cannot have any role in our social life. It should also be very straightforward to 
solve philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections 
which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." 
Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
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We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock 
or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the 
logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the language describing 
HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on philosophical aspects of 
human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into the W/S framework gives some 
clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language. If not, then showing how 
they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. I repeat what 
Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ 
(see my review): “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been 
removed--yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been 
explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might 
think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification 
and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various 
theories, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are comprised of a 
series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language (the mind) works, 
and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they become more like W’s 
perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” When there is a question 
one has to go back to the examples or consider new ones. As W noted, language 
(life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged 
father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics where one can often 
derive a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the 
use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing 
HOT. 
 
Once again: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes 
and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
 Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but 
there is a residue which evinces itself when he insists on using dispositional S2 
terms which describe public behavior (thinking, knowing believing etc.) to describe 
S1 ‘processes’ in the brain, that e.g., we can understand consciousness by studying 
the brain, and that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it 
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abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language games and giving 
them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As noted in my other 
reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major tragedy of S’s (and 
nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to take the later W 
seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to England to study) and 
making the common fatal mistake of thinking he is smarter than W. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- 
-I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the 
solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already 
said everything. --- Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! 
…. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas 
the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-
314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian 
subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and 
there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute 
that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark 
on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading expert on W for many 
years) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What 
needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms 
of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
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self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” ((Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de- sac- p15(2005)) 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2, which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships 
so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the basic structure of 
social behavior. 
 
Several comments bear repeating. So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal 
(world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 
has content (i.e. is representational) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., 
see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the 
paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified 
by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think 
they are. We should see that belief, desire and imagination--desires time shifted and 
decoupled from intention-- and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow 
thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) 
rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as 
they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 
and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by learned deontic 
cultural relations, so that our normal experience is that we consciously control 
everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life 
Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One 
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refers to the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB), 
and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) which 
can be acted out, and which can become true or  false (`I know my way home')--i.e., 
they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in 
BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk 
about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we 
shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it 
means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). —And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. 
And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we 
don’t want to deny them.   W PI p308 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
Like Carruthers, Coliva, S and others sometime state (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in my reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is 
 53 
 
correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and 
S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what S and various authors here call 
the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has 
to be a sense in which S1 is able to become propositional and they and Searle note 
that the unconscious or conscious but automated activities of S1 must be able to 
become the conscious or deliberative ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions 
of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, 
but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if 
true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the 
facts of the world could be decided without consciousness. As W stated often and 
showed so brilliantly in his last book ‘On Certainty’, life must be based on certainty-
- automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and 
pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical 
reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain 
chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-
-i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior 
that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I 
would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution 
of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of 
DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate 
cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right”, but the 
ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive 
fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the 
conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often result 
in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in 
targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The 
Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone 
familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
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A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) 
"It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and that in spite of his 
frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find—beyond even Searle’s ‘theories’ (who often criticizes W for his famous anti-
theoretical stance). 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W BBB p34 
 
“Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” (SPCP) (2008) is a superb and 
unique book, but so totally ignored that my 2015 review was at the time the only 
one! It should be obvious that philosophical issues are always about mistakes in 
language used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful 
sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. 
Such views can exist of philosophy in the broad sense but that is not what 
philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and substantive 
philosophy) is about. It could take a whole book to discuss this and S does an 
excellent job, so I will just comment here that regarding p35 in SPCP, propositions 
are S2 and not mental states, which are S1 as W made quite clear over ¾ of a century 
ago, and that both Quine and Davidson were equally confused about the basic 
issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of Quine). 
As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W’s 
“background” to its logical conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that 
he might have to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find (with W) 
incoherent. What are the COS (the truthmaking event, the test or proof) that could 
show the truth vs the falsity of our not having a choice to lift our arm? 
 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic 
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EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W noted frequently). It’s also 
true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, etc.  are complex language 
games and they do not carry meaning along in little backpacks! One must dissect 
ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how another usage (context) differs. 
 
Philosophers (and would-be philosophers) create imaginary problems by trying to 
answer questions that have no clear sense. This situation is nicely analyzed by 
Finkelstein in ‘Holism and Animal Minds’ and also admirably summed up by Read 
in ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’ quoted above. 
 
Wittgenstein’s ``Culture and Value`` (published in 1980, but written decades 
earlier), though it´s perhaps his least interesting book, has much that is pertinent to 
this discussion, and of course to a large part of modern intellectual life. 
 
``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.`` 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are 
still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the 
people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language 
has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As 
long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the same 
way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we still have the adjectives ´identical´, 
´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an 
expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling 
difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems 
capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the 
transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human 
understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
Likewise let us try to distill the essence from two of Searle’s recent works. 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue 
of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the 
agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The real paradox of the 
traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid fact - value 
distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the 
distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
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"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of 
language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the 
forms of the status function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic 
powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on 
is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic structures make possible desire-
independent reasons for action...The general point  is very clear: the creation of the 
general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a 
system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
That is, the functioning of our linguistic System 2 presupposes that of our pre-
linguistic System 1. Also it is not possible for us to accept or reject DIRA1, rather as 
part of S1 they are innate and rejecting any of S1 is incoherent. 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
That is, our mental functioning is usually so preoccupied with system 2 as to be 
oblivious to system 1. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With the 
important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a 
sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have the logical form 
of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in 
existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) Status Function  
Declarations,  including the cases that  are not  speech  acts in  the explicit  form of 
Declarations." 
Searle MSW p11-13 
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"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word) – to - world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that sense, 
they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. The 
conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and intentions-in-action, 
like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind direction of fit. They are not 
supposed to represent how things are but how we would like them to be or how we 
intend to make them be...In addition to these two faculties, there is a third, 
imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the 
way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to 
fit...the world-relating commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional 
content without any commitment that it represent with either direction of fit." Searle 
MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional 
states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. 
This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because 
there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the 
conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true not just for 
statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to 
act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional attitudes' by many. COS 
are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of PNC: "Thus saying something 
and meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of 
satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself 
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shall have conditions of satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is 
anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of 
satisfaction... is that such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be 
or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function 
causally in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a 
physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. And the 
same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any 
other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" 
MSW p74 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the 
higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle 
contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which 
commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or proto-linguistic 
interactions in which gross muscle movements were able to convey very limited 
information about intentions. 
 
Most people will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" 
or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing 
S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to Searle's taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can only become T or 
F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins thinking about them in S2. 
 
Searle often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for Intention in Action (IA) "We have different levels of description 
where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in addition to the 
constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation."(p37 
MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those of 
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IA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are mental 
states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action (IA) which are 
conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-reflexive (CSR). The critical 
argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) it is essential that 
they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of cognition and 
volition are summarized in Table 2.1 (p38 MSW), which Searle has used for many 
years and is the basis for the much extended one I present here and in my many 
articles. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, memory 
and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of 
giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, 
they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of 
our psychology are not evidential. 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A function 
is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are intentionality-relative 
and therefore mind dependent...status functions... require... collective imposition 
and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
 
I suggest, the translation of "The intentionality of language  is  created  by  the  
intrinsic,  or  mind-  independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) as 
"The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious 
axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in mind that behavior is 
programmed by biology. 
 
Once again, Searle states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, 
reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and 
many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic 
to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the 
same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
 60 
 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. 
As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on 
certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a 
doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of 
vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude 
higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of billions 
and hundreds of millions of years of natural selection by inclusive fitness. They 
facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms out in genetics. 
All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-linguistic conventions' and 
`extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring to EP and especially to the 
unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for all behavior. As W said many 
times, the most familiar is for that reason invisible. 
 
Here again is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: 
We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-- i.e., desires displaced in space and 
time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce dispositions to behavior 
that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness- IF (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all 
unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include 
the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher 
order DIRA of S2 (DIRA2) that require language are uniquely human. The paradox 
of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 acts and their cultural 
extensions that are desire independent) is that the unconscious DIRA1, serving long 
term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short 
term personal immediate desires. Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious 
or merely automated DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only 
reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis 
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for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness of 
it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and the 
impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly (“…introspection can 
never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this argument are extremely 
simple—no test, no language and a test can only be public. If I grow up alone on a 
desert island with no books and one day decide to call the round things on the trees 
‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and say ‘coconut’ it seems like I have started 
on a language. But suppose what I say (since there is no person or dictionary to 
correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ and the next day something else? Memory is 
notoriously fallible and we have great trouble keeping things straight even with 
constant correction from others and with incessant input from media. This may 
seem like a trivial point, but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the 
Outer—i.e., our true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or 
false testable statements regarding everything in the world, including our own 
behavior. Though W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a 
century ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with 
any discussion of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, 
Johnston and others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity with 
Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Functionalism, or any other behaviorist excretions that 
deny our inner life, needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
 Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’(1991) is one of the better works 
for gaining insight so I discuss it in detail (see my review for more). 
 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. Thus, 
on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that is not a 
mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, believing 
etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston and Moyal-Sharrock are exceptions) that 
W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) 
suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in the 
brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He also 
suggested several times that the causal chain has an end, and this could mean both 
that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further or 
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that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point (p34). 
Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions without any idea that W 
anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century now in a few instances). On p32 
the “counter-factual conditionals” refer again to dispositions such as “may think it’s 
raining” which are possible states of affairs (or potential actions—Searle’s 
conditions of satisfaction) which may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to 
Searle’s 3 gaps of intentionality, which he finds critically necessary. 
 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is 
anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there is no 
mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there is a 
general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is an 
act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another 
statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations vs 
publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation on p36 -
41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss 
the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to community practice into 
thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social 
conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are only possible 
given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the background. Budd 
correctly rejects this misinterpretation several times (e.g., p58). 
 
In Budd’s next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern 
psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and untestable 
background. His comment (p47) ...” that our beliefs about our present sensations 
rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the ‘myth of the given’ is one of the 
principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be misunderstood. Firstly, he 
makes the universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, but it is better to reserve this 
word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made very clear, the sensations, 
memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and not subject to belief in the usual 
sense but are better called understandings (my U1). Unlike our S2 beliefs (including 
those about other people’   s S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd 
explains this well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for 
saying one is in pain. That is, justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 
dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 reflexive fast unconscious processing. 
His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like everyone who 
discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he needs to do is say that 
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in S1 there is no possible test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the ‘inner 
process’ stands in need of outward criteria’. That is, introspection is vacuous. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true-only causal experiences of S1 and the reasoned 
dispositions of S2. 
 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the designation 
of dispositions to act, or in Searle’s terms, the specification of Conditions of 
Satisfaction, which make the utterance true. 
 
Again, Budd’s discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that we 
‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that we have 
a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-only and a mistake 
is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different kind than a mistake in 
S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns reasons, and that is why 
seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of the way of a speeding car is 
not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets it right again — “So the infallibility 
of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is compatible with the thesis that a true 
self-ascription of pain must be caused by a physical event in the subject’s body, 
which is identical with the pain he experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following 
statement that W would not accept this based on one or two comments in his entire 
corpus, since in his later work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing 
the causal automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds 
back to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only 
because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are 
highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how S1 
and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean by 
‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the slow 
S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they are so 
well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple ways 
which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively interested in 
what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., aspectual or S2 higher 
order processing of images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of behavior, it 
is of great value to refer to Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (1993) 
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and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate nature of language. 
 
In Budd’s chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—
the relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, few have fully 
understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, 
Budd’s discussion of seeing (automatic S1) vs visualizing (conscious S2 which is 
subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus, one can understand why one cannot 
imagine an object while seeing it as the domination of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 
it is the familiar issue of there being no test for my inner experiences, so whatever I 
say comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s face counts as the image of Jack. Similarly, 
with reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is 
the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where that lack of any test 
makes them inapplicable. See Bennet and Hacker’s ‘Neurophilosophy’, DMS, etc. 
for discussions. On p120 et seq. Budd mentions two of W’s famous examples used 
for combatting this temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a 
tribe that had only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was 
not possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—i.e., they 
are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc. But 
we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ as a 
fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence W’s 
famous comment (p120)—“The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been 
made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the speech 
itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process and this can 
be seen as another version of the private language argument -- there are no such 
things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we thought before we act 
(speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb 
‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a 
potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to eat” 
has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t describe an 
intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is speech) then it 
wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in either case? 
 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), 
we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth conditions. 
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Hence the quote from W: “When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going 
through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the 
vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever 
I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely 
aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet” and “Like 
everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found 
in the grammar of the language.” 
 
And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ and 
that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order descriptive 
psychology as one can find. Again, this quashes Searle’s frequent criticism of W as 
anti- theoretical—it all depends on the nature of the generalization. 
 
It helps greatly in this section of Budd on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., 
of how dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it means to 
utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE (possible events) 
which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) which makes 
it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or physical behavior (pacing the 
room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The harmony of thought and reality is that 
jack arrives regardless of my prior or subsequent behavior or any mental states I 
may have and Budd is confused or at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) 
that there must be an internal description of a mental state that can agree with 
reality and that this is the content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted 
to the automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The 
content (meaning) of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that 
he comes and not any inner mental event or state, which the private language 
argument shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. We have very clear 
verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. And as W and S 
have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the sentence 
‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought (sentence) that Jack will come and the COS 
is the same—that Jack does come. And so the answer to the two questions on p133 
and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be crystal clear — “In virtue 
of what is it true that my expectation does have that content?” and “What has 
become now of the hollow space and the corresponding solid?” as well as “…the 
interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, 
the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it should also be quite 
clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be the 
required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
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Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my image 
of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the 
image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if shown his picture 
and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the photo matches 
the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of 
him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)” and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in “that’s Him” 
and “…what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence 
W’s summation (p140) that “What it always comes to in the end is that without any 
further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the 
question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. 
And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … Suppose 
it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the COS 
and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. 
Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by 
reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is less 
substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are the same—
i.e., they are causally self- referential (or causally self reflexive as Searle now 
prefers)—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at my table, it is clear 
emotions have much more in common with the fast, true-only automatisms of S1 
than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2, but of course S1 feeds S2 and in turn 
S1 automatisms are often modified by S2 and S2 “thoughts” can become 
automatized (S2A). 
 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model 
of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the 
picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of 
such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of 
introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
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Now let us take another dose of Searle. 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the 
existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a 
physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further 
causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of 
cognition ... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real 
physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a 
New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at 
much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of 
intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same 
sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual 
intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense of 
`information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an 
information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
And another shot of Wittgenstein. 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name 
`philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
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"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not anything 
that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is connected, I believe, 
with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon 
it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
(e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the logical extensions 
of S2 into culture. 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social 
behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while 
the later W shows how it is based on true- only unconscious axioms of S1 which 
evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophy has no practical impact whatsoever 
except to clear up confusions about how language is being used in particular cases. 
Like various ‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon views of life (religious, 
political, psychological, sociological, anthropological), it is too cerebral and esoteric 
to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that even its 
adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Likewise, with other academic 
‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social Science Model widely shared by 
sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history and literature. However, 
religions big and small, political movements, and sometimes economics often 
generate or embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology 
(human nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions 
(EP defaults), and help to lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly every 
social practice and institution, which are there to facilitate replication of genes and 
consumption of resources). The point is to realize that these are on a continuum 
with philosophical cartoons and have the same source (our evolved psychology). 
All of us could be said to generate/absorb various cartoon views of life when young 
and only a few ever grow out of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
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confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ anywhere substitute 
‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others believe or know is 
thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as ‘mindreading’ 
(Understanding of Agency or UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, the COS 
are the test of what is being thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe 
it’s raining’, ‘I believe I believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise 
for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), namely that it’s raining. This is the 
critical fact to keep in mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of 
dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’). 
 
Now for a few extracts from my review of Carruthers’ (C) ‘The Opacity of Mind’ 
(2013) which is replete with the classical confusions dressed up as science. It was 
the subject of a precis in Brain and Behavioral Sciences (BBS) that is not to be missed. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), who 
seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the use of ‘I’ 
since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard reduction of S2 to 
S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading and all the language and concepts of 
anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness and will (as S often notes), so 
such an account would be just a cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which 
one could say of most philosophical and many ‘scientific’ disquisitions on behavior. 
The W/S framework has long noted that the first-person point of view is not 
eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but this is no problem for the cartoon 
view of life. Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- all well debunked countless times 
by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly 
unclear “representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction 
(COS) is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the 
COS that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett and Searle) thinks he is an expert on W, having 
studied him early in his career and decided that the private language argument is 
to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his 
work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are 
you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of 
a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in 
its modern ‘computationalist’ form. W/S insist on the indispensability of the first-
person point of view while C apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or 
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“self”. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to 
characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and many 
others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed D in 
various writings and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let us recall that 
W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the point he is mostly 
very easy to follow, while C is captivated by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous 
sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers with specific language games, 
preferring experiments and observations that are quite difficult to interpret in any 
definitive way (see the BBS responses), and which in any case have no relevance to 
higher level descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do  they fit into the 
Intentionality Table). One book he praises as definitive (Memory and the 
Computational Brain) presents the brain as a computational information 
processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and repeatedly annihilated by S and 
others, including W in the 1930’s. In the last decade, I have read thousands of pages 
by and about W and it is quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this he joins a 
long line of distinguished philosophers whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, 
Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky etc. (though Putnam began 
to see the light later). They just cannot grasp the message that most philosophy is 
grammatical jokes and impossible vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
 
Books like ‘The Opacity of Mind’ that attempt to bridge two sciences or two levels 
of description are really two books and not one. There is the description (not 
explanation, as W made clear) of our language and nonverbal behavior and then 
the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of the experimental 
method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; 
though problem and method pass one another by."(W PI p232), Cet al are enthralled 
by science and just assume that it is a great advance to wed high-level descriptive 
psychology to neuroscience and experimental psychology, but W/S and many 
others have shown this is a mistake. Far from making the description of behavior 
scientific and clear, it makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of 
God that Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give 
such memorable accounts of behavior without any experimental science 
whatsoever. Of course, like politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut 
up, so this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The bottom line 
has to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest the 
philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to 
those of W/S, are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and 
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consciousness are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are meaningless, having 
no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive science have any heuristic 
value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other 
animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into 
physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the many 
criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and physiology may be 
of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others often do, C does not 
reveal his real gems til the end, when we are told that self, will, consciousness are 
illusions (supposedly in the normal senses of this words). Dennett had to be 
unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., doing the 
usual philosophical move of not explaining at all and in fact not even describing) 
but amazingly C admits it at the beginning, though of course he thinks he is 
showing us these words do not mean what we think and that his cartoon use is the 
valid one. 
 
One should also see Bennett and Hacker’s criticisms of cognitive science in 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ (2003) and their debate with S and 
Dennett in ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ (2009-and don’t miss the final essay by 
Daniel Robinson). It is also well explored in Hacker’s three recent books on "Human 
Nature". 
 
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but there 
is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that chemistry will 
absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will absorb physiology or genetics, nor that 
biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, sociology, etc. This is 
not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact that they are different levels 
of description with entirely different concepts, data and explanatory mechanisms. 
But physics envy is powerful and we just cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, 
math, information, and computation vs the vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be 
possible. Reductionism thrives in spite of the incomprehensibility of quantum 
mechanics, uncertainty, wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and 
the incompleteness and randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my full review of 
Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ and the excerpts here) and its irresistible 
pull tells us it is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air from 
W: “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it 
was a requirement.” PI p107. It is hard to resist throwing down most books on 
behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything trying to ‘explain’ higher 
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order behavior to e.g. these quotes from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-
138_239-309.html. 
 
It is clear to me after reading ten thousand pages of philosophy in the last decade 
that the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where 
ordinary language morphs into special uses both deliberately and inadvertently, is 
essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy and other behavioral 
disciplines).Using special jargon words (e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not 
work either as there are no philosophy police to enforce a narrow definition and the 
arguments on what they mean are interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so 
precious and dense it’s often painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to 
embrace his terminology and makes some egregious mistakes, while W is hands 
down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is doing, and nobody 
has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement of the 
mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and diagnosed 
and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore him 
and biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and millions of 
articles and most religious and political organizations (and until recently most of 
economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life.  But the world is not a 
cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of life (e.g., 
socialism, democracy, multiculturalism) collide with reality and universal 
blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse of civilization. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists 
for the same reason as all basic behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which 
seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, 
rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious. 
 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is most 
striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping back to 
S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes with no 
conscious awareness of driving at all. On reflection, this automatism can be seen to 
account for almost all of our behavior, with just minimal supervision and awareness 
from S2. I am writing this page and have to “think” (i.e., let some time pass) about 
what to say, but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and by and large 
it’s a surprise to me except when I think of changing a specific sentence. And you 
read it giving commands to your body to sit still and look at this part of the page, 
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but the words just flow into you and some kind of understanding and memory 
happen, but unless you concentrate on a sentence there is only a vague sense of 
doing anything. A soccer player runs down the field and kicks the ball and 
thousands of nerve impulses and muscle contractions deftly coordinated with eye 
movements, and feedback from proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, 
but there is only a vague feeling of control and high-level awareness of the results. 
S2 is the Chief of Police who sits in his office while S1 has thousands of officers 
doing the actual work according to laws that he mostly does not even know. 
Reading, writing or soccer are voluntary acts A2 seen from above, but composed of 
thousands of automatic acts A1 seen from below. Much of contemporary behavioral 
science is concerned with these automatisms. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of Searle’s PNC, “The Phenomenological 
Illusion” (TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the 
automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only 
primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that 
W showed this some 60 years earlier and gave the reason for it in the primacy of the 
true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 which 
is the source of the Inner. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features 
of the world as S1 or The Inner, and ‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The 
Outer should prove very revealing. As Searle notes, the Phenomenologists have the 
ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the 
defaults of their EP. 
 
Another excellent work on W that deserves close study is Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ (1993). He notes that some will object that if our reports and 
memories are really untestable they would have no value but “This objection misses 
the whole point of W’s argument, for it assumes that what actually happened, and 
what the individual says happened, are two distinct things. As we have seen, 
however, the grammar of psychological statements means that the latter constitutes 
the criteria for the former. If we see someone with a concentrated expression on her 
face and want to know ‘what is going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us 
that she is trying to work out the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly what 
we want to know. The question of whether, despite her sincerity, her statement 
might be an inaccurate description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The 
source of confusion here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have 
a different grammar from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What 
makes the inner seem so mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one 
concept in terms of another. In fact our concept of the Inner, what we mean when 
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we talk of ‘what was going on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious inner 
processes, but to the account which the individual offers of her experience…As 
processes or events, what goes on inside the individual is of no interest, or rather is 
of a purely medical or scientific interest” (p13-14). 
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer 
matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he underlines 
the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior. We don’t just want to know that 
the person’s body was in such and such a position and that her features arranged 
in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her account of what lay behind 
this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails to 
lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that without 
publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between following the 
rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
On p55 Johnston makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made many 
times by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the Outer is 
entirely dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable nature of our 
direct first-person experience of the Inner. The System 2 sceptical doubts concerning 
mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the true-only certainties of 
System 1 and the certainty that you are reading these words now is the basis for 
judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged. This mistake is one of the most basic 
and common in all philosophy. 
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of checking 
your statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly called 
‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling, far from being a 
defect of our psychology, is exactly what gives these statements interest. “I am 
tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another bit of data about 
the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under your eyes. 
 
Johnston then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that 
meaning or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that accompany 
speech. As W pointed out, just consider the case where you think you understand, 
and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any inner experience to 
meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc. The experience which 
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counts is the awareness of the public language game we participate in. Similar 
considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning speed of thought’. “The key is 
to recognize that thinking is not a process or a succession of experiences but an 
aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What corresponds to the lightning speed of 
thought is the individual’s ability to explain at any point what she is doing or 
saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if one calls the beginning and the end of the 
sentence the beginning and end of the thought, then it is not clear whether one 
should say of the experience of thinking that it is uniform during this time or 
whether it is a process like speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar as her 
account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are interested in is 
the account of the past she is inclined to give and the assumption that she will be 
able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her as conscious” (p 91). 
That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our conscious, voluntary S2 
psychology. 
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to 
communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural and 
unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, we can only 
contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep communication is by 
contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it is in plays 
(or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them and 
thus lack a precise duration as well as levels of intensity and the content is a decision 
and so is not a precise mental state, so in all these respects they are quite different 
from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses like S1 emotions. 
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put it- this was not a terminology available 
to J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with the first person 
use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere utterance) true-only 
sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being true or false evidence-
based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining and it isn’t” but other 
tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” or the third person “He 
believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: “The general issue at the heart 
of the problem here is whether the individual can observe her own 
dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note that the individuals 
description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the description of a state of 
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affairs…In other words, someone who says she believes P is thereby committed to 
asserting P itself…The reason therefor that the individual cannot observe her belief 
is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory stance towards it, she undermines it. 
Someone who said “I believe it’s raining but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her 
own assertion. As W notes, there can be no first person equivalent of the third 
person use of the verb for the same reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely 
would lack a first person present indicative...the two propositions are not 
independent, for ‘the assertion that this is going on inside me asserts: this is going 
on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-56). Though not commented on by W or J, the 
fact that children never make such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe 
I want it” etc., shows that such constructions are built into our grammar (into our 
genes) and not cultural add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the point 
of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when in any case 
I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my knowing what I 
believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer my behaviour from 
my words? That is the fact.” 
 
(RPP1 p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis for 
cognition, and as the non- propositional substrate for determining truth and falsity, 
cannot be intelligibly judged. 
 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the LG’s 
(within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
Johnston continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which is 
summed up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it is 
hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden from 
the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under certain 
conditions, believe his expression and there, error has no place. And this asymmetry 
in the game is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden from other people.” 
(LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is not that inner is hidden but that the 
language game it involves is very different from those where we normally talk 
about knowledge.” And then he enters into one of W’s major themes throughout 
his life—the difference between man and machine. “But with a human being the 
assumption is that it is impossible to gain an insight into the mechanism. Thus, 
indeterminacy is postulated…I believe unpredictability must be an essential 
characteristic of the Inner. As also is the endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 
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p645 and LWPP2 p65). Again, W probes the difference between animals and 
computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our humanity. 
Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling (and so the 
Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence for something important, 
that we base a judgement on this involved sort of evidence, and so that such 
evidence has a special importance in our lives and is made prominent by a concept.” 
(Z p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades of 
meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner states and 
the lack of fixed relationships between our concepts and experience. W:  ”One can’t 
say what the essential observable consequences of an inner state are. When, for 
example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, and what not? 
There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they can’t be described in 
the same way as reactions which characterize the state of a physical object.” (LWPP2 
p90). J “Here her inner state is not something we cannot know because we cannot 
penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is nothing determinate to know.” 
(p195). 
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless of 
scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity might 
turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of 
understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that involved in 
the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientist’s discovery, it 
could not be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” (p213). 
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one thought is 
a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the Tractatus? And 
when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a rash of them? The 
notion of intentions creates similar problems…These subsequent statements can all 
be seen as amplifications or explanations of the original thought, but how are we to 
suppose this relates to the brain state? Are we to imagine that it too will contain the 
answer to every possible question about the thought? ..we would have to allow that 
two significantly different thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words 
may in one sense be interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems 
for the attempt to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the 
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same in one sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a 
fragile and artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could 
make to talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219). That is, the 
same thought (COS) “it’s raining” expresses an infinite number of brain states in 
one or many people. Likewise, the ‘same’ brain state might express different 
thoughts (COS) in different contexts. 
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. “Here the 
postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what happened from a 
trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He then notes an example 
from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he reads and who cannot repeat 
the text without the marks but they don’t relate to the text by rules …  ”The text 
would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our 
nervous system?” and also “…nothing seems more plausible to me than that people 
will someday come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the 
physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought or 
a particular idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be 
psychological regularities to which no physiological regularities correspond; and as 
W provocatively adds ‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time 
they were upset.’” (RPP1 p905) …’Why should not the initial and the terminal states 
of a system be connected by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary 
state? (RPP1 p909) ... [It is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated 
with associating or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off thought 
processes from brain processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed 
out of chaos? ...as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not 
really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing.’(RPP1 
p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just leave 
explaining alone? -but you would never talk like that if you were examining the 
behavior of a machine! – Well who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a 
machine in this sense?’” (RPPI p918) (p 220- 21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W anticipates 
the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self-organization in biology. Since 
uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine now, from subatomic 
to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather etc.,) and cosmology, why 
should the brain be an exception? The only detailed comments on these remarks I 
have seen are in a recent paper by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS). 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of 
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behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, 
sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even 
the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is 
a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly this preposterous 
situation will change, but probably not much. 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and 
the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book ‘Human Nature’ (2011), 
especially p226-32, is critical for any student of behavior. It is a nearly universal 
delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” is not but W 
exposed this many times. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific and 
mathematical concepts. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind that 
‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. 
are all complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully described in 
BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
Searle make many interesting remarks in one of his most recent books ‘Thinking 
About the Real World’ (TARW)(2013),and I seem to have written the only review, 
so I will discuss it in detail here. 
 
On p21 of TARW we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s 
work and one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read the later 
W and his commentators more carefully. He refers to free will as an “assumption” 
that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, self, world, and all 
the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the axiomatic bedrock of our 
behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we have two 
hands or live on the surface of the earth or that Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps 
this huge mistake is connected with his blending of true only S1 and propositional 
S2 which I have noted. Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right and 
stumble on this! 
 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which he 
first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts of 
things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to 
comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you can’t 
speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is 
unfortunate that he does not use the S1/S2 concepts as it makes it so much easier to 
keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very un-
Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical elements, you 
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can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of perceptions and 
memories, in a way that it is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically 
structured representational elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the 
dispositional intentionality of S2, where conscious thought and reason (i.e., 
potential public actions expressible in language) became possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) see elsewhere here and my reviews of his other 
works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states, and his reference to mental 
states as representations (actually ‘presentations’ here) with COS, is (in my view) 
counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the apple we see is the 
COS of the CSR – (Causally Self Reflexive--i.e., cause is built in) perception of the 
apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the same status (i.e., a 
COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. Thus, the mental states of S1 
are to be included with the actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s 
ontology and epistemology I don’t see the advantage of this, but I have the greatest 
respect for him so I will work on it. I have noted his tendency (normal for others 
but a flaw in Searle) to mix S1 and S2 which he does on p29 where he seems to be 
referring to beliefs as mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s 
BBB in the 30’s that S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense of S1. We 
need always to keep clear the difference between the language games of S1 and S2 
and so if he insists to use the game of belief in reference to S1 then it is much clearer 
if we refer to B1 and B2 where B2 is the word “belief” as used in reference to the 
public linguistic acts of System 2. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true-only unconscious 
percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic automatic functions 
of our evolved psychology (EP). As noted, one can read Hutto and Myin’s book 
‘Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content’ (2012) and their sequel for 
a very different recent account of the nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and which I 
have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a 
revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior (though less so if one 
understood W). He has continued to develop the naturalistic description of 
behavior and on p39 he shows how ethics originates in our innate social behavior 
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and language. A basic concept is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action 
(DIRA), which is explained in his various books. For an outline see my reviews of 
his MSW and other works. He tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 (i.e., 
dispositional psychology and culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior 
I regard it as superficial unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break 
his DIRA into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms of the 
unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus, I would 
restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their natural 
inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as “…people are compelled 
to override their immediate personal benefits to secure long term genetic benefits 
via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as 
stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I 
have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of describing 
the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event 
in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the fact that his framework is a 
straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the 
lack of any significant reference to W in this book. As usual one also notes no 
apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by 
providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the 
superficial proximate cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on p202 
is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain is automatic 
true-only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (ca. 500 msec or more) it 
becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 function that can be 
expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle contractions as well). 
Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ 
of red or pain, once we begin to reflect on it, normally are blended together into one 
‘experience’. For me by far the best place to get an understanding of these issues is 
still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else has 
ever described the subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must 
keep constantly in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, 
‘experience’, ‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—
even S stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly 
restate all of p202 separating the true-only non-judgeable S1 from the propositional 
S2 then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. And of course, very 
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often (i.e., normally) words are used without a clear meaning—one has to specify 
how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to be used in this context and W is the only 
one I know of who consistently gets this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional automatic causal 
dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way to 
describe S1 states, which provide the raw material for deliberate conscious S2 
dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary point of view (and what 
other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is right on the 
money— the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a 
naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self and intention work and cannot 
meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall S’s famous review of 
Dennett’s ‘Consciousness Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. 
And this makes it all the more bizarre that S should repeatedly state that we don’t 
know for sure if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that the 
confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, idealism, 
materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal susceptibility to the 
defaults of our psychology — ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI) as he has 
termed it, and bewitchment by language as beautifully described by W. As he notes, 
“The neurobiological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, 
described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily 
movement? …How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you 
analyze what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is 
causally, you see analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer only 
if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a condition 
that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue of the 
satisfaction of that condition.” as “Meaning is achieved by stating a publicly 
verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is raining” is true if 
it is raining and false otherwise.  Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is 
that our linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that 
exists independently of our representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that 
does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
Time for some more quotes and a discussion of his recent book of reprints 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (2008) and as elsewhere I will repeat some 
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comments to place them in a different context. 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, only 
a machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does not name a 
machine process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, implemented on a 
machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a 
physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as computational 
does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is essentially an observer 
relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I 
am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to 
physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition 
fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a 
homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the 
existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a 
physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further 
causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of 
cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real 
physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science is at 
much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of 
intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same 
sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used to record both the visual 
intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision…in the sense of 
‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an 
information processing device.” Searle PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue 
of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the 
agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The   real paradox of the 
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traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact-value 
distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the 
distinction.”  Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of 
language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the 
forms of the status function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic 
powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on 
is to recognize a  reason for action…these deontic structures make possible desire-
independent reasons for action…The general point  is very clear: the creation of the 
general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a 
system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle 
PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no 
causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying 
neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot be 
reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that 
Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but 
rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there 
is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must 
be voicing some variant or extension of what W said (as they must if they are both 
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giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find most of S foreshadowed in W, 
including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI and 
related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room 
interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually 
unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also 
written a series of superb papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP 
(Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as 
extended into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. 
 
W’s insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into 
intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the 
multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems to be 
aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful statement 
of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical processing of 
facts--i.e., information processing). Of course, later (but before the digital computer 
was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in great detail why these were incoherent 
descriptions of mind (thinking, behavior) that must be replaced by psychology (or 
you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life). S however makes little reference 
to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism, and his destruction of it in his 
later work. 
 
Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of 
behavior, and perhaps the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), 
but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others 
(but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and 
AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it 
is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction.  See my 
articles for more details. 
 
Like W, Searle is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his 
written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. 
On p7 of PNC he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but as Coliva, DMS et al 
have noted, W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of 
doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories 
and thoughts, since it is the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the 
first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, 
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which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and 
nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is 
propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against 
the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and 
over again. One word-- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one that 
emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many counterexamples. 
Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear examples but soon 
became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a theory in a quite different 
sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a summary of a thousand pages 
of W’s examples and one resulting from ten pages. 
 
Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that 
is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter 
of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-only 
perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if nothing 
is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner experience 
stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to miss this.  See W or 
Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many contexts, 
and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in numerous 
perspicuous examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal 
connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us." And, as explained above, I feel the questions with which S ends section 
3 are largely answered by considering W’s OC from the standpoint of the two 
systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of science. Rodych has done an 
article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at the time, but I will have to reread 
it to make sure. 
 
Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of 
causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any 
page of W and much of DMS, Coliva, Hacker etc. for the reasons. It’s one thing to 
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say bizarre things about the world using examples from quantum mechanics, 
uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our normal use of 
words. 
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) 
of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., 
as applied to S1, which is composed of mental states in the present only, and S2 
which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on ‘social glue’ which, 
from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and universally 
expanded during personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious 
deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view of 
mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to them 
and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points 
he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a century earlier before there were 
computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, 
causal, automatic, non- propositional, true-only mental states, while slow S2 can 
only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less 
conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived 
(ascribed) intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals 
have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W 
appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of 
psychology masquerade as cutting-edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-
scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of 
superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, Carruthers, 
Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still not 
quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms of the 
cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, he gives 
cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious to me (as it 
was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all 
behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of 
which we mostly remain oblivious. As noted above, Searle has described this as TPI. 
Again, on p65 I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its 
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extensions in his OC and other works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we 
are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. See 
the earlier section of this article dealing with OC and DMS. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., 
psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning (COS) in this 
psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they have been given 
recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the 
same word into ignoring that vast difference in its use (meaning). These comments 
are all extensions of classic Wittgenstein and in this connection, I recommend 
Hutto’s and Read’s papers too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, while 
demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his failure to 
grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value of recent 
psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to 
obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of 
S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is 
clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the 
primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate 
System 1. Like so many others, Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. 
Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, 
Heidegger and the others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so 
does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing that 
TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to our EP 
that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these words at one point, 
but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its immense implications for the 
world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years 
to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably Osho, 
Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc.), we are all meat puppets stumbling 
through life on our genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our 
almost total preoccupation with using the second self S2 personality to indulge the 
infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s 
only about reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much noise 
about Global Warming and the imminent collapse of industrial civilization in the 
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next century, but nothing is likely to stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. 
Dick and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this 
and this and this is baby. Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and 
not just another primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. 
Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a 
rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, and 
of course the insistence on the critical nature of first-person ontology is totally 
Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) type of 
explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view, it is clearly another 
instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) has made many 
times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb Chapter 9. The genes 
program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat 
puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments or those of DMS 
on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and 
the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning it 
involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the 
utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the unconscious 
automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, 
bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world 
in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or proto-linguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements 
were able to convey very limited information about intentions and S makes a similar 
point in Chapter10. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings 
(contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to 
read my comments and those of DMS, Coliva, Andy Hamilton etc., on W’s OC so 
he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 
to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would 
also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s various books and 
papers, as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 
and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior 
approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or 
F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions 
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permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or proto-linguistic society, is 
cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a 
condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is 
the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be 
imagined to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: 
Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would 
write a book doing exactly that. 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With the 
important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a 
sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have the logical form 
of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in 
existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) Status Function 
Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of 
Declarations.” 
Searle MSWp11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction 
of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or 
world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are 
supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that sense, they are 
supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. The 
conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and intentions-in-action, 
like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind direction of fit. They are not 
supposed to represent how things are but how we would like them to be or how we 
intend to make them be…In addition to these two faculties, there is a third, 
imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the 
way that the propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to 
fit…the world-relating commitment is abandoned and we have a propositional 
content without any commitment that it represent with either direction of fit.” 
Searle MSWp15 
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“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state 
…and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a 
distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional content…we 
have the same propositional content with different psychological mode in the case 
of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or type in the case of the 
speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true or false and thus have the 
mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can be true or false and thus have 
the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as my desires or intentions cannot be 
true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied, so my orders and 
promises cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—
we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional content 
and a direction of fit as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief 
represents its truth conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an 
intention represents it’s carrying out conditions…The intentional state represents 
its conditions of satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental 
representation must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as 
I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has 
conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction…we 
can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing 
their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, 
corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to Expressives is 
the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where the Presup fit is 
taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. 
Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those 
facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language” MSW p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a 
physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. And the 
same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any 
other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs” 
MSW p74 
 
 92 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because 
there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the 
conventions of a language without creating commitments.  This is true not just for 
statements but for all speech acts” MSW p82 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can 
do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of 
course “theory” and “description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s 
theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point was that 
by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true accounts of our 
behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account for ALL behavior 
(ALL language games), while S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he 
gives several examples of his own mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly 
modify their theories to account for the multifarious language games, they get 
closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
The Primary Language Games (PLG's) are the simple automated utterances by our 
involuntary, System  1,  fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-propositional, 
mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts (‘will’) including 
System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as 
joy, love, anger, which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
Secondary Language Games (SLG's) are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, 
System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and 
often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc., which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's a fact that 
attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, 
mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good 
disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., 
`I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, 
genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to 
give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense in the future--
`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 
and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 
etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or 
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"Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that 
`Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all 
philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is 
not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just 
have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to those 
who have kept up with Searle’s work. 
 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards them 
as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as 
exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As quoted 
above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can deny that any revision of our 
concepts (language games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. 
You can read just about any page of W for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre 
things about the world using examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., 
but it is another to say anything relevant to our normal use of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal cultural deontic 
relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of behavior I expect it fairly 
describes S’s work. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists 
for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP 
which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through 
slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious (TPI). 
I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in 
his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we 
are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to (not possible 
to) doubt. 
 
Now let us review Searle’s brilliant summary of his many years of work on the 
logical structure of the ‘social glue’ that holds society together as set forth is his 
‘Making the Social World’ (2010). 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
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on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to 
act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional attitudes’ by many. COS 
are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of PNC: “Thus saying something 
and meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of 
satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself 
shall have conditions of satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is 
anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of 
satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be 
or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function 
causally in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or 
DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between 
true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional 
(at least in some places in his work) since they can only become T or F (aspectual as 
S calls them here) after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point in 
PNC that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of 
past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or proto-
linguistic society, is cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one 
event, so for IA (Intention in Action) “We have different levels of description where 
one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition to the 
constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation.” (p37). 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
“representations” or “information”) while S2 has “content” and is downwardly 
causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with “conditions of 
satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are caused 
by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be with how we 
think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination—desires time 
shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of 
our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their 
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COS in) the CSR (Causally Self Reflexive) rapid automatic primitive true only 
reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology there are intermediate or 
blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the 
causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past 
or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. The two systems feed into 
each other and are often orchestrated by the learned deontic cultural relations 
seamlessly, so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything 
that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has 
described as ‘The Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his writings, 
what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly everyone—the 
notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It follows in a very 
straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd period work and from 
the observations of contemporary psychology, that ‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ 
are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there 
is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. 
As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. S understands and uses basically this same argument in 
other contexts (e.g., skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite surprising he 
can’t see this analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when he says such things 
as that we have “good evidence” that our dog is conscious etc. The true-only axioms 
of our psychology are not evidential. Here you have one of the best descriptive 
psychologists since W, so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are 
built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in order 
to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented with “The prelinguistic 
axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which evolve 
during our maturation into their cultural manifestations.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant here. 
“A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… require… 
collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by the 
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intrinsic, or mind- independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as “The 
linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the unconscious 
axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep in mind that 
behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his writings 
that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal 
clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is 
propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates 
that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that 
skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and 
in fact social life (and perhaps all animal life depending on what one regards as 
“propositions”) would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology 
shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty— automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die (could 
not evolve). 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for 
material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see them, 
because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the world into objects 
and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any problem with 
objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences being segmented into 
words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the primitive 
reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with a 
syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and writing, I 
would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal 
muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than contractions of 
other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude higher for visual 
information.’ 
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On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., why 
does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of exposition 
in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” is of course 
classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no general answer to 
why people accept institutions is clearly wrong. They accept them for the same 
reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive fitness. It facilitated 
survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). 
Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague 
talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra- linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical 
semantics’ is in fact referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms 
of S1 which are the basis for all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most 
familiar is for that reason invisible. 
 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. Totally 
illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of course a minimal 
counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the ability to pretend and 
imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved in time and space shifting) 
are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and critical to higher order thought. But 
even here there are many animal precursors (as there must be), such as the 
posturing of ritual combats and mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by 
bower birds, the broken wing pretense of mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, 
‘cleaner’ fish that take a bite out of their prey and simulation of hawk and dove 
strategies (cheaters) in many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq.). Saying 
that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ means 
that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only 
automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic book 
‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing the formal 
apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. “Factitive Entities’ do 
not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ (desire or obligation), ‘effector’ 
(body muscles), ‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) and ‘total reason’ (all relevant 
dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human behavior 
and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed 
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the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the 
conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), 
which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in various neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. This may seem infelicitous as well, but has the virtue that it is based on 
fact, and given the complexity of our higher order thought, I don’t think a general 
description is going to get much simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’) is that S2 has generated the action consciously for 
reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with 
modern biology and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical 
reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (genetically 
programmed need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), 
which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 
of how we carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the language game of DIRA in System 2) as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive 
fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of 
DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate 
cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the 
ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive 
fitness of their distant ancestors (and also e.g., the Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacism destroying America and the world).  
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2, 
which produces reasons for action that often result in activation   of   body   and/or   
speech   muscles   by   S1   causing   actions.   The   general   mechanism   is   via   
both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', 
by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social 
Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which 
we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
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psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: “We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire 
–Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA— i.e., desires displaced in space and time, 
most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in 
higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending her 
brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., 
DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 or DIRA2 that require language 
are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer description of his 
“explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called ‘description’) on the 
bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the 
S2 desires and their cultural extensions). That is, “The resolution of the paradox is 
that the recognition of desire-independent reasons can ground the desire and thus 
cause the desire, even though it is not logically inevitable that they do and not 
empirically universal that they do” can be translated as “The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate 
the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires.” Likewise, for his discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 
(Evolutionary Psychology, Reciprocal Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, System 1) which 
ground the dispositions and ensuing actions ofS2. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must get 
them from biology as there is no other option and the above description shows how 
this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations DO always 
prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics works because 
the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate personal short term 
desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, extends to conclusions 2 
and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these 
are not just anything but, with few if any exceptions, very restricted extensions of 
DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really means to ascribe deontics to our conscious 
decisions alone then he is prey to ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which he so 
beautifully demolished in his classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). 
As I have noted above, there is a huge body of recent research on implicit cognition 
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exposing the cognitive illusions which comprise our personality. TPI is not merely 
a harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which 
produces the illusion that we control our life and our society and the world, and the 
consequences are almost certain collapse of industrial civilization during the next 
150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will (i.e., 
choice) in some non-trivial sense it would all be pointless, and he has rightly noted 
that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain an unnecessary 
genetically and energetically expensive charade. But, like nearly everyone else, he 
cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests (p133) that choice may be an 
illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our 
axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without 
contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot in the normal case doubt 
you are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Now lets us briefly review Searle’s most recent book, ‘Seeing Things As They Are’ 
(STATA-2015). See the full review for further comments. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for on 
page 4 we have the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used in some 
normal sense, but we are doing philosophy, so we are going to be undulating back 
and forth between language games with no chance of keeping our day to day games 
distinct from the various philosophical ones. Again, you can read some of Bennett 
and Hacker’s ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or ‘Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has 
still not adopted the two systems framework, so it’s much harder to keep things 
straight than it needs to be. 
 
On p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, deliberative, 
slow, with no precise time of occurrence, and ‘it is raining’ is their public Condition 
of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is propositional and 
representational and not a mental state and we can only intelligibly describe it in 
terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is system 1 and so requires (for 
intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s COS1) and has a determinate time of 
occurrence, is fast (typically under 500msec ), nontestable (Wittgenstein’s true-only 
or intransitive), and nonpublic, automatic and not linguistic, i.e., not propositional 
and presentational and only describable in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite 
 101 
 
of this on p7 after crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional 
attitude’, he says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that 
S1 is true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 
where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and 
then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description, which 
W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the end of the 
paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) so for “The 
subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an intentional content 
and the specification of the intentional content is the same as the description of the 
state of affairs that the intentional content presents you with etc.” I would say 
‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be described in the public 
language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting again the equivalence of a 
description of believing with that of a description of our perception, he is repeating 
what W noted long ago, and which is due to the fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and 
that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, etc. are all different psychological or 
intentional modes or language games played with the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private experiences’ (i.e., S1) can 
only be their public manifestations (S2) —i.e., language we all use to describe public 
acts, as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach language to something 
internal. This is of course W’s argument against the possibility of a private 
language. He also mentions several times that hallucinations of X are the same as 
seeing X, but what can be the test for this except that we are inclined to use the same 
words? In this case, they are the same by definition, so this argument rings hollow. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which is not 
an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, i.e., to the 
fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front of me, the 
content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man himself. If I am 
having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual experience has a content, but 
no object. The content can be exactly the same in the two cases, but the presence of 
a content does not imply the presence of an object.” The way I see this is that the 
‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the mental state (S1) and if we put this 
in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this does entail 
the public object, but for an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the 
‘object’ is only the similar mental state resulting from brain activation. 
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As W showed us, the big mistake is not about understanding perception but about 
understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are exactly the 
same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a particular context 
so as to yield clear COS. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we fail 
to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 or we 
must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., no COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 and 
not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the next 
page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of philosophy, and it is 
so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral sciences, cannot get into 
the 21st century and use the two systems terminology which renders so many 
opaque issues very clear. Likewise with the failure to grasp that it’s always just a 
matter of whether it’s a scientific issue  or  a  philosophical  one  and  if philosophical 
then which language game is going to be played and what the COS are in the 
context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W made 
so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the whole 
neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only be a public 
phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my having an 
experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which will lead to 
others. Many think these don’t matter, many think they do. Something happens in 
the brain but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue and certainly by 
‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means the neurophysiology. Clearly 
this is not a matter for scientific investigation but one of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more philosophical 
jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted the two systems 
framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). Likewise, for the 
following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, ‘visual experiences’, 
‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we have to decide what the 
COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties of S1 and S2 all of this 
becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could stop ‘struggling to express’ 
it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means that perceptions are S1 and so 
mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, untestable (true-only, i.e., no public 
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tests) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not mental states, do not 
have a definite time, have reasons and not causes, are testable with COS etc. 
 
On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are part of 
the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts which have 
become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate dividing 
line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2), which means S1 passes the percept to 
higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and expressed in 
language. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 and 
‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in the same 
sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science (e.g., physics) 
would be different if people realized they were playing language games and not 
doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no language 
as it’s automatic and reflexive, so when saying what I saw, or to describe what I 
saw, I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out long ago as showing 
the limits of language. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so that 
“Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of representation, and 
because all representation is under aspects, the visual presentations will always 
present their conditions of satisfaction under some aspects and not others.” 
becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data to S2, which has public COS, 
we can speak of S1 as though it also has public COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers 
to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events which make the statement true or false and 
‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ refer to S1 and S2. 
 
On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds its 
data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract 
muscles, and lower level perception (P1) and higher level perception (P2) can only 
be described in the same terms due to there being only one language to describe S1 
and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less mysterious if he would adopt the 
two systems framework, so that instead of “internal connection” with conditions of 
satisfaction (my COS1), a perception would just be noted as the automaticity of S1 
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which causes a mental state. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because the 
language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly speak 
of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is ‘meaning is 
not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the experience’) 
merely describes the conditions of the language game of perception—it is an 
automatic causal mental state (P1) when we are speaking of System 1. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective world 
is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual experiences like 
this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer ‘this’ so it should be 
stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to incline me to call it ‘red’ ”—
as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest of the paragraph is unnecessary 
as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of S1, 
and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times, these cannot 
intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously activated ‘hinges’ 
that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or most of 
philosophy in the narrow sense ) could be titled “The language games describing 
the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient  mental states of S1 
with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking of S2” and the 
background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted, but it is our 
axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of W’s ‘On 
Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my comments I think 
the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and W’s insights in OC is 
confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of perception where it can at 
best only describe how the language of perception works in various contexts. We 
can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used and that’s the end of it and for the last 
sentence of this section we might say that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only 
for it to normally result in the same words being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated what 
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many ((e.g., DMS (Danielle Moyal-Sharrock) an eminent contemporary philosopher 
and leading W expert)) regard as the greatest discovery in modern philosophy—
W’s revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’, as nobody can do 
philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated and 
being confused. And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his 
whole career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at a 
symposium on it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he 
is certainly aware of the view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing 
here. I don’t think this meeting was published, but his lecture can be downloaded 
from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. Though 
he has probably pioneered more new territory in the descriptive psychology of 
higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein (excepting perhaps Peter 
Hacker whose writings are rather dense and his 3 volumes on Human Nature very 
recent), once he has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. Like everyone, 
he uses the French word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and spell 
English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when one 
can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and education, 
academics are sheep too and they are almost all following lower class semi-literates 
not only into bad English, but into Neomarxist Third World Supremacist Fascism. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W made 
clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to describe ’primary 
qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary qualities’), which then 
has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows the errors one commits by 
failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge epistemology’ presented in 
“On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is with the dual system terminology 
I would have to rewrite the whole chapter (and much of the book). Since I have 
rewritten sections here several times, and often in my reviews of Searle’s other 
books, I will only give a couple brief examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. The 
concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to produce 
certain sorts of experiences. So, the reason that these experiences present red objects 
is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity to produce this sort of 
experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to produce this other sort of 
experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have these experiences without it 
seeming to them that they are seeing a red object or a straight line, and that 
“seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality of the perceptual experience.” 
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Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 and the way we use the word ‘red’ 
mandates it’s COS in each context, so using these words in a particular way is what 
it means to see red. In the normal case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we 
just see red and we use ‘seem to” to describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand that 
there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 due to the 
many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, i.e., percept, 
memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing behavior (language, 
thinking) perfectly in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of 
extrapolating from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts 
(language games - i.e., words in limitless contexts) we use to describe it. The 
‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 used to describe S1. Again, I think his 
failure to use the two systems framework renders this quite confusing if not opaque. 
Of course, he shares this failing with nearly everyone. Searle has commented on this 
before and so have others (e.g., Hacker, W in various contexts) but it seems to have 
escaped most philosophers and almost all scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem to 
see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the experience 
and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that constitute the 
innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have the experience 
and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public language with this word 
in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this is a hinge—an axiom of our 
psychology that is our automatic action and is the basis for assumptions or 
judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly be judged, tested or altered. 
As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 is of an entirely different kind than 
one in S2. No explanations are possible—we can only describe how it works and so 
there is no possibility of getting a nontrivial “explanation” of our higher order 
psychology. As he always has, Searle makes the common and fatal mistake of 
thinking he understands behavior (language) better than Wittgenstein. After a 
decade reading W, S and many others I find that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’, 
aphorisms and trialogues usually provide greater illumination than the wordy 
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disquisitions of anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything hypothetical 
in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone 
must take it’s place.” (PI 109). 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a pattern 
of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that we see a red 
rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English speaking 
person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces the words ‘I 
see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or simply, S1 produces 
S2 in appropriate contexts. So, on p136 we can say S1 leads to S2 which we express 
in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes (but never ‘explains’) how the 
language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context and we can translate “For basic 
actions and basic perceptions the intentional content is internally related to the 
conditions of satisfaction, even though it is characterized non- intentionalistically, 
because being the feature F perceived consists in the ability to cause experiences of 
that type. And in the case of action, experiences of that type consist in their ability 
to cause that sort of bodily movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead 
automatically (internally) to basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to 
withdrawing the arm) which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected 
upon and described in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true or 
false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and Myin’s 
first book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to play a 
language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for a few 
hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get language attached 
(aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that Searle, as part of his lack of attention to the later 
W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of color 
words in W’s ‘Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every discussion 
of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game with color 
words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience‘, etc. in this public linguistic context 
(true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language and no meaning in a 
private one (S1). So, it does not matter (except to neuroscientists) what happens in 
the mental states of S1 but only what we say about them when they enter S2. It’s 
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clear as day that all 7.8 billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of neural 
activation every time they see red and that there is no possibility for a perfect 
correlation between S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical for every 
philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the normal 
relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. The same 
applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation definitively over 80 
years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can 
one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
Chapter 6: yes disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent and 
the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and even 
among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy of Mind 
classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his Wittgenstein 
studies. 
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is true-
only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental states 
which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language games of 
S2. 
 
On p204 -5, representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, knowing 
etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is infinitely variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then one 
should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological mental states, 
and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual shapes) that are 
public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion of unconscious 
mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any clear sense. 
 
Sadly, on p211 Searle, for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly in his 
lectures), says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on noted, one 
cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ such as our having choice, nor that we 
see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express the true-only axioms of our 
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psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis for action. 
 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On Certainty’ 
who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and that its 
foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is the basis of doubt and 
certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted many times that 
a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public COS and cannot be 
tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads not to further testing but 
to insanity. 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent essay 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’. 
There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private experiences as 
‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed us, language can 
only be a public testable activity (no private language). And on p230 the problem is 
not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that (like most if not all 
philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that has no clear COS. As 
W insisted all we can do is describe—it is the scientists who can make theories. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good 
as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the fundamental insights 
of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two systems of thought 
framework, which could have made it brilliant. 
 
I again note that W posed an interesting resolution to some of these ‘puzzles’ by 
suggesting that some ‘mental phenomena’ (i.e., words for dispositions leading to 
public acts) may originate in chaotic processes in the brain and that there is not 
anything corresponding to a memory trace, nor to a single brain process identifiable 
as a single intention or action--that the causal chain ends without a trace, and that 
‘cause’, ‘event’ and ‘time’ cease to  be applicable (useful—having clear COS). 
Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions based on physics and the 
sciences of complexity and chaos.  One must however recall that ‘chaotic’ in the 
modern sense means determined by laws, but not predictable, and that the science 
of chaos did not exist until long after his death.  And again let me note that chaos 
theory has been proven to be both undecidable and incomplete (in Godel’s sense).   
 
All our behavior (or brain functioning if you wish) has its origin in our innate 
psychology, so the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, 
political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., and the ‘hard 
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sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology are a mix of the language game 
questions, which I have discussed here, with the real scientific ones as to what the 
empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and I repeat what Wittgenstein told us 
long ago.  
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness." (BBB p18) 
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less 
accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it 
encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, 
literature, mathematics, politics etc.).   
 
The key to society is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that is leading most of the 
world to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that lead inexorably to Hell on Earth. I 
describe this in detail in my books ‘Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century’ 
4th ed. (2019) and ‘Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World’ 
2nd ed. (2019). 
 
 
 
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less 
accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it 
encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, 
literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and 
rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both 
conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic 
System 1 actions or reflexes.   
 
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent 
students of behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the 
logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting 
point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all truly ‘philosophical’ problems 
are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so 
all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at 
issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The 
basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) 
any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I 
analyze various writings by and about them from the modern perspective of the two 
systems of thought (popularized as ‘thinking fast, thinking slow’), employing a new 
table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature.  I show that this is a 
powerful heuristic for describing behavior.  
 
 
Thus, all behavior is intimately connected if one takes the correct viewpoint. The 
Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and 
extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that 
Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they 
suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they 
differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of 
their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via 
the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true.  While the 
phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and 
their descendant’s future.   
 
 
 
